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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States, after ignoring climate policy for the last
decade, now finds itself debating the merits of a national cap-and-trade
policy. Currently, U.S. environmentalists are divided over whether to
support the watered-down American Climate and Energy Security bill
(ACES), also known as the Waxman-Markey bill. ACES passed the U.S.
House of Representatives only after significant changes were made to
address concerns from the coal industry and other powerful forces; and
the bill likely faces even more compromises if it is to be passed in the
U.S. Senate.' Supporters of the Waxman-Markey bill believe it is best to
establish the carbon market immediately, even if the emission caps are
too high, the supply of available offsets is too high, and the ultimate
price of greenhouse gas (GHG) emission allowances is too low.2 The key

2

David Hunter is Associate Professor of Law at The American University's Washington College
of Law and Director of the Program on International and Comparative Environmental Law. The
author thanks Cameron Burton and Erika Lennon for their research assistance, Climate change
policy is a moving target. As this article goes to press, the US Senate is mired in continued
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Washington,
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May
2009,
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at
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question now is whether a flawed market is better than no market,
whether a soft price for carbon can still establish long-term incentives to
reduce carbon, and whether the market can be fine tuned in later periods.
As the United States wrestles with the development of a national
cap-and-trade system for GHGs, it is natural and appropriate to revisit
the experience of the European Union (EU). The EU has been
aggressively addressing climate change for nearly a decade,3 including
through the use of an extensive and ambitious cap-and-trade system.
Although many observers have criticized EU efforts to address global
warming, 4 this article argues instead that the EU has been largely
successful in demonstrating the feasibility of an international carbon
market and in continuing the momentum of multilateral cooperation to
address global warming.
Although admittedly the European context is different in
important ways, lessons from the EU experience can nonetheless be
helpful in illuminating the current debate over a U.S. cap-and-trade bill.'
Interestingly, many of the same problems of over-allocation and potential
windfall profits that plagued the early phases of the EU Emissions
Trading System (ETS) are present in the Waxman-Markey bill.6 The
'learning-by-doing' approach taken by the European Union, for example,
does support those who believe a flawed system, like that presented in
the Waxman-Markey bill, can be improved over time and that the most
important thing is to get on with the creation of the carbon market.
Critical to the EU experience has been an adaptive approach that has
allowed for periodic and regular adjustments to the rules shaping the
carbon market. If the United States is doomed to repeat many of the
initial mistakes made by the European Union, it should also ensure that
See Camilla Bausch & Michael Mehling, Climate and Energy-Lessons Learned: The European
Perspective, 35 AM. INST. FOR CONTEMP. GERMAN STUD. POL'Y REP. 39 (2008), available at

http://www.aicgs.org/documents/pubs/polrep35.pdf, for a comprehensive overview of EU
climate policy.
4 See, e.g., Steven Mufson, Europe's Problems Color U.S. Plans to Curb Carbon Gases, WASH.
POST, Apr. 9, 2007, at A01; 'U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO Doc. 09-151,
INTERNATIONAL

CLIMATE CHANGE PROGRAMS: LESSONS LEARNED

FROM THE EUROPEAN

UNION'S EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL'S CLEAN DEVELOPMENT
MECHANISM (Nov. 2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09l5l .pdf.

5 As of this writing, the U.S. House of Representatives has passed the American Clean Energy and
Security Act of 2009, also known as the "Waxman-Markey Climate Bill." American Clean
Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 11 1th Cong. (2009) [hereinafter American Clean
Energy and Security Act]. The legislation is currently pending before the Senate.
6
See infra text accompanying notes 121-29.
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the regulatory system can be adaptive and flexible in modifying the capand-trade system over time.
This article examines the experience with the EU ETS and draws
lessons relevant to current debates in the United States. Part II of this
article reviews the EU experience with the ETS, highlighting changes
that have been made along the way to adapt and improve the
performance of the resulting carbon market.7 Part III identifies some
lessons that have been learned from this experience and highlights
particularly how those lessons shed light on current U.S. policy debates. 8
II. THE EU CLIMATE POLICY
A. THE CHANGING CONTEXT OF THE EU CLIMATE POLICY
The EU's approach to climate change is intertwined with the
negotiations of the global climate regime, particularly the 1997 Kyoto
Protocol.9 The EU designed its climate policy largely to assist the
Member States in complying with their collective obligations under the
Kyoto Protocol. Significant changes since those negotiations have shifted
some of the assumptions underlying the Kyoto Protocol and presented
unforeseen challenges for the European Union. The parties negotiating
the 1997 Kyoto Protocol sought to establish a basic cap-and-trade
structure under the implicit assumption that they had enough time to
experiment with implementation of the Protocol and still address global
warming effectively. Indeed, the Kyoto Protocol was intended as the first
step in implementing specific emission reduction commitments.'" Most
observers did not believe that the emission caps accepted by the
industrialized parties (so-called Annex I parties)," would be sufficient to
7 See infra text accompanying notes 9-86.

See infra text accompanying notes 87-129.

Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted Dec.
10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (entered into force Feb. 16, 2005) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
10 See, e.g., id. at art. 3, cl.9 (referencing "commitments for subsequent periods" for Annex I
parties), art. 9, cl.I (setting forth the provisions for 'reviewing' the adequacy of the Protocol's
commitments). See generally MICHAEL GRUBB, ET AL., THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: A GUIDE AND

ASSESSMENT

149-50 (1999);

SEBASTIAN OBERTHUR & HERMANN E. Orr, THE KYOTO

253-60 (1999).
Annex I parties are the industrialized or "developed" countries, including the United States, all of
Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Japan, as well as the so-called Economies in
Transition (ElTs) such as Russia, Ukraine and the other former communist Eastern European
countries. See UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, KYOTO
PROTOCOL: INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY
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address climate change fully. 12 The common belief was that the caps
would have to be tightened over time and that any loopholes in the
trading system (i.e. the so-called flexibility mechanisms) would be fixed
in subsequent recording periods.
Despite the best intentions of using the Kyoto Protocol as the
first step to combat global warming, two major developments after the
negotiations derailed the plan, effectively undermining the broader
context of the climate regime. First, climate change accelerated much
more quickly than expected, and most observers now believe that to
avoid catastrophic impacts from climate change, GHG concentrations
must be stabilized at lower levels sooner than believed during the Kyoto
negotiations.13 As a result, significantly less time exists to experiment
with and fine-tune the carbon market.
The second major unexpected development after the Kyoto
negotiations was the unilateral repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol by the
George W. Bush administration.4 The U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto
Protocol dramatically changed both the structure of the anticipated
carbon market and the potential for the Protocol to effectively address
PROTOCOL REFERENCE MANUAL: ON ACCOUNTING OF EMISSIONS AND ASSIGNED AMOUNT 3,

12

at
available
(2008),
13
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/08_unfccc..kp-ref-manual.pdf.
See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, at Annex B (setting forth the reduction targets for each Annex
I party). The aggregate total reductions among all industrialized countries would be 5.8%
reductions from 1990 levels, if the Kyoto Protocol was fully ratified and implemented. The
aggregate total reductions among all industrialized countries would be a 5.8% reduction from
1990 levels, if the Kyoto Protocol were fully ratified and implemented. In the negotiations
leading up to the Kyoto Protocol, the European Union sought reductions of 7.5% by 2005 and
10% by 2010, and the G-77 sought even deeper cuts. The final totals were based less on what
was scientifically considered to be necessary than on what was politically feasible to be
See generally DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN & DURWOOD ZAELKE,
negotiated.
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY 676-79 (3rd ed. 2007) (recounting the

negotiating positions of various parties leading into the Kyoto negotiations).
13 See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:

(Fourth
Assessment
Report
SYNTHESIS
REPORT
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr-spm.pdf,

2007),
CHRIS

available
at
WOLD, DAVID

HUNTER & MELISSA POWERS, CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW 10-47 (2009) (summarizing

current science regarding the cause and impacts of climate change); NICHOLAS STERN, KEY
ELEMENTS

14

OF

A

GLOBAL

DEAL

OF

CLIMATE

CHANGE

(2008),

available at

htp://www.ise.ac.uk/collections/granthamlnstitute/publications/KeyElementsOfAGlobaDeal-30
Apr08.pdf; William L. Hare, A Safe Landing for the Climate, in WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE,
STATE OF THE WORLD 2009, 13-29 (2009) (arguing that to avert serious climate change requires
more aggressive reductions).
Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, President Bush Discusses Global Climate
http://georgewbush(June
it,
2001),
Change
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010611-2.html.
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climate change. The Kyoto Protocol was designed to provide a large

supply of emission credits in part because of the expectation that the
United States would join Europe as a major purchaser of those emission
credits. With the U.S. departure from the Kyoto Protocol framework, a
major buyer of carbon offsets under the Protocol's Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) 5 and other flexibility mechanisms was no longer at
the table, making it substantially more difficult to maintain the Kyoto
framework while still ensuring appropriate price signals in the resulting

carbon market.
Despite the U.S. repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol, the European

Union forged ahead, leading the way toward an international consensus
to implement the Protocol through the so-called "Marrakesh Accords." 16
Because of the leadership of the European Union and Japan, a sufficient
number of countries agreed to ratify the Protocol and ensured its entry

into force even without U.S. participation.

7

The Kyoto Protocol's entry

into force was uncertain and was only possible because the European

Union made the Protocol a top foreign policy priority. 18

'5 The clean development mechanism (CDM), see Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, at art. 12, is one of
the Kyoto Protocol's three market mechanisms (the other two being "joint implementation", id.
at art. 4, and international emissions trading, id. at art. 6). The CDM is a project-based
mechanism through which an investor (typically a developed country) purchases emissions
credits that result from reduced emissions in a project located in a developing country. The
following illustrates how the CDM works: all other things being equal, assuming that it is
cheaper to convert a coal fired power plant to natural gas in S~o Paulo than in Paris, a French
utility facing requirements to reduce GHG emissions could invest in the Brazilian project and in
return, the French utility would receive carbon credits amounting to the differential between a
coal-fired (more emitting) and a gas-fired (less emitting) power plant.
16 The Marrakesh Accords are a set of agreements reached at the Seventh Conference of the Parties
to the UNFCCC (COP-7) in 2001 that created a framework to move towards international
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. Some observers have written that the US repudiation in fact
catalyzed the EU leadership's determination to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. See, e.g., Louise Van
Schaik & Karel Van Hecke, Skating on Thin Ice: Europe's Internal Climate Policy and Its
Position in the World 5 (Egmont Institute European Affairs Program, Working Paper 2008/12,
2008), available at http://www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/08/eu/081207-WP-EU-climate.pdf;
Nuno Lacasta et al., Articulating a Consensus: The EU's Position on Climate Change, in PAUL
G.

HARRIS,

EUROPE

AND GLOBAL

CLIMATE CHANGE:

POLITICS, FOREIGN

POLICY

AND

REGIONAL COOPERATION 211-31 (2007).'
17 See GRUBB ET AL., supra note 10, at 255; see also WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE, STATE OF THE
WORLD 2002, at 25 (2002).
18 See Van Schaik & Van Hecke, supra note 16, at 5-6 (stressing the importance of climate change
policy to the EU, as well as how involvement and leadership has benefited the EU); see also
Sebastian Oberthur & Claire Roche Kelly, EU Leadership in InternationalPolicy: Achievements
and Challenges, INT'L SPECTATOR, Sept. 2008, at 36 (recognizing that the EU had a "vital role"
in ensuring the Kyoto Protocol entered into force).
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After the Kyoto Protocol went into force, the European Union
went further and made climate change a centerpiece of European
environmental policy and indeed of EU policy overall.' 9 The European
Union developed a comprehensive climate and energy policy with the
creation of a carbon market through the EU ETS as the region's primary
approach to implementing the Kyoto Protocol.2" Underlying the ETS was
the assumption that such a carbon market would set the price sufficiently
high to incentivize private actors to reduce their emissions.

B. INTRODUCTION TO THE EU CLIMATE COMMITMENTS
The European Union is currently comprised of twenty-seven
Member States,2" twenty-five of which have individual Kyoto targets.22
At the time the Protocol was negotiated, the European Union was
comprised of only fifteen Member States; those original fifteen members
agreed to a collective approach to reducing emissions under the
Protocol.23 The European Union participated in those negotiations as a
regional economic integration organization (REIO) as contemplated by
24
Article 4 of the Kyoto Protocol.
Operating as a REIO, the fifteen EU Member States collectively
agreed to an 8 percent reduction of GHGs below 1990 levels.25 The
Member States also agreed to operate under a "bubble," allowing them to
aggregate and collectively report their emissions to meet their joint

9 The European Union had already been concerned with climate change policy in the decade
20

preceding Kyoto. See 1993 O.J. C138/5 3.a.
European Parliament and Council, Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a

scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending
Council Directive 96/61/EC,OJ 2003 L275/32 (2003) [hereinafter ETS Directive].
2' The current members of the European Union are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus,
Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain,
Sweden,
and
United
Kingdom.
See
European
Countries,
http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/indexen.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2009).
22 The only two Member States that do not have an individual Kyoto target are Cyprus and Malta,
for they were neither EU Member States nor Annex I Parties under the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at the time of the Protocol's adoption.
See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 11, at Annex I.'
23 The fifteen Member States of the European Union in 1998 were: Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, and United Kingdom.
24 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, at Art. 4.
25 Id. at Annex I.
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target. Within the bubble, however, each Member State could agree to
reach completely different, individual targets without violating the
Protocol's initial targets, as long as the overall aggregated emissions
achieved the REIO's collective cap.26
Soon after the Kyoto negotiations concluded, the European
Union reached its so-called burden sharing agreement in 1998, which
distributed among the fifteen Member States the overall 8 percent
reduction target.27 Some Member States committed to large reductions in
their emissions from 1990 levels while others were not required to
commit to any reductions. Germany, for example, agreed to a 21 percent
reduction below 1990 levels, the United Kingdom agreed to a 12 percent
reduction. Some countries, including Spain (+15%), Portugal (+27%),
Greece (+25%), and Ireland (+13%), were allowed to increase their
emissions above 1990 levels.2 8 The burden sharing agreement was
critical for allowing the lesser-developed economies of the European
Union to continue to increase emissions while the more developed
economies would bear a greater burden of reduction. Germany's
negotiated reductions were so large in part because they were integrating
the inefficient industry of eastern Germany into their economy, and they
were transitioning from lignite to the more efficient hard coal. Similarly,
the UK planned a massive switch in energy generation from coal to
natural gas that was expected to yield significant emissions reductions
over the Kyoto Protocol's timeframe.29
In accordance with the Kyoto Protocol's provisions,3"
notification of the EU's internal burden sharing agreement was
subsequently provided to the United Nations and the climate regime

26 Id. at Art. 4.1.
27 Doc. 9702/98 of 19 June 1998 of the Council of the European Union reflecting the outcome of

proceedings of the Environment Council of 16-17 June 1998, Annex I (on file with author); see
also Presidency Conclusions, Cardiff European Council (June 15-16,1998), available at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cmsData/docs/pressData/en/ec/54315.pdf.
28 See GRUBB ET AL., supra note 10, at 122-23 (reprinting the internal redistribution of the EU
'bubble').
29 The United Kingdom's shift to natural gas did not occur as expected; the high price of natural
gas in 2005-2006 slowed demand. See FRANK CONVERY, DENNY ELLERMAN & CHRISTIAN DE
PERTHUIS, THE EUROPEAN CARBON MARKET IN ACTION: LESSONS FROM THE FIRST TRADING

PERIOD 17 (MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Report No. 162)
(June 2008).
30 Kyoto Protocol, supranote 9, at Art. 4.2.
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parties.3' Countries that later joined the European Union retained the
targets and baselines that had been negotiated separately as part of the
Kyoto Protocol's negotiation in 1997.32
To meet the reduction commitments set forth in the Kyoto
Protocol and subsequently redistributed, the European Union devised an
integrated set of policies and measures known as the European Climate
Change Program (ECCP), the cornerstone of which was a cap-and-trade
system for some key energy relevant sectors. Although much attention is
rightly given to this cap-and-trade system, the European Union has a
multidimensional approach to its climate policy.33 In addition to the ETS,
a variety of other policies and measures were adopted, including:
comprehensive monitoring of greenhouse gas emissions,34 renewable
energy targets for 2010," and voluntary emission reduction agreements
with the automobile industry.36 This policy framework was upgraded
considerably in 2008-2009, both in terms of targets and measures and in

31 Council Decision 2002/358, art. 5, 2002 O.J. (L 130) (EC).
32

The countries that joined the European Union in 2004 that were also parties to the Kyoto

negotiations included the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Slovakia, and Slovenia. All of the countries were designated in Annex B as "Countries
undergoing a transition to a market economy." Except for Poland (6% reduction), they had all
accepted reductions of 8% over the baseline, although countries in economic transition were
allowed some flexibility in choosing a baseline year other than 1990 (so their emission reduction
targets are not exactly comparable to those of the countries who were members of the European
Union in 1997). See id. at Art. 3.5, Annex B, Art. 4.4 (countries subsequently joining an REIO
retained their original commitments).
33 See generally Bausch & Mehling, supra note 3.
34 Commission Decision 2004/156/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 59) 1 (EC) (establishing guidelines for the
monitoring and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council).
35 Council Directive 2001/77/EC, On the Promotion of Electricity Produced from Renewable
Energy Sources in the Internal Electricity Market, 2001 O.J. (L 283) 33 (EC) (establishing an
indicative target at the EU level for renewable energy; the targets were made mandatory in many
Member States as a result of domestic legislation).
36 See Commission Recommendation 1999/125/EC, On the Reduction of C02 Emissions from
Passenger Cars, 1999 O.J. (L40)49 (noting the commitment by the European Automobile
Manufacturers Association). Even greater diversity was shown by the Member States
themselves, so the net result was significant experimentation among climate policies throughout
Europe. Some of the policies proved ineffective, but many others contributed significantly to
reductions in GHG emissions. Germany's pioneering use of feed-in tariffs (FITs), for example,
has widely been credited with sparking significant growth in the use of renewable energy in
Europe. See NATALIE CHALMERS ET AL., EARTH ACTION & ALLIANCE FOR RENEWABLE
ENERGY, RENEWABLE ENERGY PAYMENTS: A POLICY GUIDE TO FEED-IN TARIFFS IN AMERICA

(2009), available
at http://www.allianceforrenewableenergy.org/resources.html#3,
information regarding feed-in tariffs.

for
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terms of legislation to prepare the European Union for the 2012-2020
period.37
C. THE EU EUROPEAN TRADING SYSTEM

The centerpiece of the EU efforts to reduce GHG emissions was
the establishment of a carbon market through the imposition of an EUwide cap-and-trade system. As described above, each country agreed to
national caps on greenhouse gas emissions. The ETS then "devolves"
emissions reduction commitments to companies (installations) across
Europe through national implementing legislation. Companies are
permitted to trade emission allowances across borders through the ETS.
The ETS addresses approximately 50 percent of all EU CO 2 emissions
and slightly more than 40 percent of total EU GHG emissions. The ETS
creates a carbon "currency," the EU "allowance,"38 which can be bought
and sold by the more than 10,000 installations across Europe that are
covered by the regulations. The system covers four sectors (iron and steel
manufacturing; cement, ceramic, and other mineral production; pulp and
paper; and energy, including electricity and oil refineries).39 It can now
be divided into three phases: a "trial" phase from 2005-2007," 0 the Kyoto
"Commitment Period" from 2008-2012,41 and the third period from
2013-2020, which was approved in December 2008.42
The ETS directive was approved in just two years, in what
became one of the fastest ever adopted EU laws. Nonetheless, the
European Commission and the EU Member States were left with little
more than twelve months to prepare the system's start on January 1,
2005. An EU directive merely directs Member States' actions. Member
States then have to establish policies and measures to operationalize the
directive at the national level. The ETS directive thus required the
elaboration, negotiation, and approval of national emission allocation
plans by multiple jurisdictions. Although inherently a complex and timeconsuming process, the compressed political timeframe left European
37 See infra notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
38 See ETS Directive, supra note 20, at Art. 3(a).
39 See id. at Annex I.
40 Id. at Art. 11(1).
41
42

Id.at Art. 11(2).
See Council Directive 2001/77/EC, Amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to Improve and
Extend the Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Scheme of the Community, 2009 O.J.
(L140) 63, 63-64 [hereinafter ETS Phase Ill Directive].
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and Member States institutions with very little time to adopt and
implement the ETS directive.
1. THE TRIAL PERIOD: 2005-2007

In the trial period, 2.2 billion CO 2 emission allowances were
issued annually.43 Caps and individual installation allocations were set by
each Member State in a National Allocation Plan (NAP) submitted to the
Commission. The Member States had some flexibility in establishing
their internal allocations, but they had to be based on objective and
transparent criteria that comported generally with those established by
Annex III of the ETS Directive." These criteria included the following:
"

Quantities of allocated allowances must be consistent with a
Member State's Kyoto Protocol and EU targets.

*

Quantities of allocated allowances should be consistent with the
potential, including the technological potential, of activities
covered by this scheme to reduce emissions.

"

*The NAP must "not discriminate between companies or sectors
in such a way as to unduly favor certain undertakings or
activities."

"

The NAP must "contain information on the manner in which
new entrants will be able to begin participating"
in the ETS and
45
in which "early action is taken into account."

The NAPs were then approved by the EU's Climate Change
Committee comprised of all Member States and the European
Commission. 46 The ETS directive required that 95 percent of the initial
allocations be given freely to the installations covered by the ETS; only
up to 5 percent of the caps could be auctioned initially. The penalties

4' There was a particular increase within the ETS. From 2005 to 2006, allowances increased
threefold. KARAN CAPOOR & PHILIPPE AMBROSI, WORLD BANK, STATE AND TRENDS OF THE

2007, at 11 (2007).
See ETS Directive, supra note 20, at Annex Ill (setting forth the criteria for the National
Allocation Plans to be submitted by each Member State to the Commission).
CARBON MARKET

4

41 Id. at Art. 9.
46

See id. at Art. 9(3).
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were set at €40 (approximately $55) per ton for any covered installation
that did not comply with its cap.47

The trial period resulted in wide fluctuations in carbon prices,
and the price of carbon ultimately largely failed to provide a consistent
incentive for meaningful emissions reductions.48 The price of carbon in
Europe plummeted from £36 ($60) to C8 ($11) and then virtually to zero
over the trial period.49 The price fluctuation has been widely attributed to
an over-allocation of emissions allowances.
The over-allocation of emission allowances during this period
was due to three reasons. First, the Commission's own NAP assessment
criteria purposely reflected relatively modest reduction goals with the
primary focus on learning-by-doing. ° Second, the underlying historical
emissions data that served as the baseline for setting national allocations
was neither particularly good nor uniform for emissions at the national
level or for individual installations. As a result, regulators did not have
an adequate or reliable database for setting overall allowances." Third,
the allowances were initially based on more than two dozen NAPs
submitted by the individual Member States and approved with
rudimentary oversight by the European Commission. This decentralized,
hands-off approach was politically necessary to gain Member State
support for the ETS, but it clearly proved detrimental to efficient market
organization, oversight, and operation. Once the generous allocation
became clear, price declines reflected this relatively abundant supply of
credits. Moreover, prices could not be stabilized because of the
prohibition against carrying over or "banking" allowances from the first
to the second trading phase.2 A Member State that had more allowances
than it needed at the end of 2007 could not use them to change its

'7

Id. at Art. 16(4).

48 See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 4, at 13-14 (discussing the fluctuation

in carbon prices in the EU ETS).'
49 CAPOOR & AMBROSI, supra note 43, at 12.

50 Member States, for example, were to submit plans consistent with a "path to Kyoto," see ETS
Directive, supra note 20, at Annex 1I1,para. 1, which essentially allowed modest upfront
reductions in the first phase under the justification that more stringent reductions would be
pursued in the second phase as the EU approached the Kyoto compliance period.
51 See, e.g., CONVERY, ELLERMAN, & DE PERTHUIS, supra note 29, at 10 ("[L]ack of installationspecific emissions data was perhaps the biggest problem.., in the allocation process"); U.S.
GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 4, at 17-20.
52 CONVERY, ELLERMAN, & DE PERTHUIS, supra note 29, at 16 ("The decision to not allow interperiod banking strongly contributed to price volatility").
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allocation in the second reporting period; such excess allowances thus
had no value after 2007."3
The plummeting price of credits during this period also meant
that no consistent price signal was sent to the private sector to invest in
greater emissions reductions. In this respect, the trial period can be
criticized, but this does not mean that the ETS was a failure. The trial
period was intended to allow for some experimentation to calibrate the
carbon market over time. Indeed, the trial phase was rushed into
implementation to allow operators to gain hands-on experience54 in
setting up and operating a first-ever carbon abatement market in the
European Union. 5 Mistakes in the trial phase could be corrected in time
for the European Union to use the second phase of the ETS as part of its
strategy for complying with the Kyoto Protocol. Forging ahead even with
an imperfect first trial period would leave Europe significantly better
positioned to curb GHG emissions than it otherwise would have been.
Although the over-allocation of allowances was regrettable, it
was not surprising that several reporting periods would be necessary to
set the price of carbon at a level high enough to incentivize real, longterm reductions. Similar adjustments were necessary in the much simpler
U.S. sulfur dioxide emissions market and were part of the reason the EU
rushed to implement the ETS trial phase in the first place. 6

53 Under Article 13 of the ETS Directive, Member States had the discretion to permit the regulated

entities to bank allowances from the first to the second trading period, but only "if it did not lead
to an allocation beyond the total allocation approved by the Commission for the second trading
period. Therefore, for each allowance allowed to be banked, an allowance must be deducted
from the total quantity issued for the second trading period." See Press Release, European
Commission, Emissions Trading: Commission Decides on First Set of National Allocation Plans
for
the
2008-2012
Trading
Period
IP/06/1650
(Nov.
29,
2006),
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/ip_1650.htm. As a result of this rule, only Poland and
France allowed banking from the first to the second reporting period.
5
See generally Communicationfrom the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament
on the Assessment of National Allocation Plans for the Allocation of Greenhouse Gas Emission
Allowances in the Second Period of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, at 2, COM (2006) 725
final (Nov. 29, 2006) (explaining first period intended to be a learning phase to help the
Commission assess the second period plans) [hereinafter EC Communication on ETS Second
Phase].
5 Market and economic instruments to combat climate change, including cap-and-trade, had been
already introduced in some European countries. Sweden and Norway, for instance, had instituted
carbon taxes, and the UK and Denmark had established emissions trading systems. At the EU
level, however, the ETS is the first-ever market based instrument to address greenhouse gas
emissions.
56 A. DENNY ELLERMAN & PAUL L. JOSKOW, THE EUROPEAN UNION'S EMISSIONS TRADING
SYSTEM IN PERSPECTIVE 14 (2008).
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This is particularly true in a politicized atmosphere with strong
economic and political interests pressuring governments to enlarge the
overall caps (and thus reduce the ultimate costs of carbon). 7 The ETS
covered virtually all of Europe's energy-intensive industries, including
energy utilities, cement and steel manufacturing, and pulp and paper
processing. A significant percentage of the EU's GDP would thus be
subject to increasing environmental restrictions in a context where
Europe's main competitor, the United States, would not be subject to
comparable standards. As expected, business lobbied hard to soften the
initial impact of the ETS on these sectors. The relatively lax targets of
the trial period were a compromise that reflected industry opposition
while still allowing for the establishment of the bureaucratic
infrastructure to create and manage the carbon market, in advance of the
Kyoto Protocol's compliance period.
With the trial phase, the European Union successfully created a
dynamic carbon market among twenty-seven nations and jurisdictions. 8
The trial phase demonstrated the technical feasibility of accounting for
carbon, measuring and monitoring emissions, and implementing a
trading platform for a wholly new commodity (carbon emissions credits).
This was a massive undertaking that was effectively implemented with
wide participation throughout Europe. For example, a UK coal-fired
power plant, which was significantly short of allowances, reportedly
acquired allowances from installations based in nineteen of the twentyfour other participating EU Member States.59
Even given the clear problems with the trial period, independent
analysis suggests that the ETS created some scarcity in allowances and at
least initially drove emissions downward, "perhaps as much as 5%."6
57 The same process of politicization has led to a similar set of compromises in the Waxman-

Markey bill that passed the House of Representatives in June 2009. See, e.g., Editorial, Waxman
Markey: Action on Climate Change is Overdue. But Is This the Best We Can Hope For?,WASH.
POST, June 26, 2009, at A24, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/06/25/AR2009062503469.html; Steven Pearlstein, For the Farm Lobby,
Too Much Is Never Enough, WASH. POST, June 26, 2009, at A18, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/25/AR20090625041 33.html;
Steven Mufson, Climate Bill Seeks A Broad Coalition: Legislation Would Cap Greenhouse
Gases, Hand Out Billions to Utilities, WASH. POST, May 16, 2009, at A9, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/15/AR2009051503367.html.
18

See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 4, at 5 ("The primary effect of the first ETS

phase was to establish a functioning carbon market ....).
59 CONVERY, ELLERMAN, & DE PERTHUIS, supra note 29, at 12.
60 See ELLERMAN & JOSKOW, supra note 56, at 35; see also Denny Ellerman & Barbara Buchner,

Over-Allocation or Abatement? A Preliminary Analysis of the EU ETS Based on the 2005
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As a result, "several researchers have concluded that the ETS resulted in
a cumulative decrease in emissions compared to a business-as-usual
scenario."61 In any event, by 2006, EU emissions were approximately 3
percent below baseline levels, which led the European Commission to
confidently report that the fifteen Member States under the burden
sharing agreement were on track to meeting their Kyoto Protocol
commitments.6 2 This reinforced the EU's underlying political and
economic argument that the Kyoto Protocol's targets were achievable
and that future global climate negotiations should build on the Kyoto
Protocol's emissions trading approach.
2. THE KYOTO COMMITMENT PERIOD: (2008-2012)
Having learned from the trial period, the European Union made
several adjustments in preparation for the second commitment period
designed to parallel the first Kyoto reporting period from 2008-2012.
These focused primarily on tightening Member States' allocation caps
and on exerting greater scrutiny in evaluating the NAPs submitted by
each Member State.63 The total allowances issued were cut by 10 percent
to two billion allowances per year. The system's pollutants covered by
the ETS were expanded from only CO 2 to include additional GHGs (on
an optional basis). The percentage of emission allowances that Member
States could subject to auctioning was increased from 5 to 10 percent.
In an effort to integrate the ETS second phase and the Kyoto
Protocol more closely, the Member States adopted an EU Directive
formally linking the two carbon markets.6' Under this linking directive,
installations regulated under the ETS could offset a percentage of their

Emissions Data, 41 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 267 (2008) (attributing a 2.5% to 5% decline in
emissions due to the ETS).
6t U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 4, at 6 (citing several studies).
62 Press Release, European Commission, Climate Change: Projections Show EU on Track to Meet
Kyoto
Emission
Targets,
IP/08/1534
(Oct.
16,
2008),
available
at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=lP/08/1534
(relying
on
2006
projections that most countries were 2.7% below baselines).
63 See EC Communication on ETS Second Phase, supra note 54, at 10. Indeed, this increased level
of scrutiny prompted several Member States to sue the European Commission, including the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia.
64 Council Directive 2004/101/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 338) 18 (EC) (amending Directive 2003/87/EC
establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emissions allowance trading within the community, in
respect of the Kyoto Protocol project mechanisms) [hereinafter ETS-Kyoto Linking Directive].'
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emissions by purchasing allowances generated through the CDM 65 or
joint implementation, both of which had been established under the
Kyoto Protocol.66 The ETS placed some restrictions on the use of these
Kyoto offsets, including that no offsets could be allowed from nuclear
power 67 or from investments in changes to land-use or forestry practices
and related carbon sinks.68 In addition, offsets from large hydroelectric
dams could only be allowed for dams that meet the World Commission
on Dams' environmental and social conditions,69 or other "relevant
international criteria."7 Overall the ETS capped the use of Kyoto offsets
at 50 percent of a Member State's required emission reductions.7 1
The second phase of the ETS is ongoing, and significant
ambiguity still exists regarding how effective it will be in reducing
GHGs through the 2008-2012 Period. The price for EU emission
allowances remained steady through the end of October 2008, when the
downturn in the global economy reduced overall emissions and demand
for allowances. As late as October 2008, the price for EU allowances for
the Kyoto period hit €25 ($36) per ton carbon dioxide equivalent
(tCO2 e). The price dropped substantially, ending 2008 around € 15 ($21)
per tCO2 e. The global recession reduced manufacturing outputs and
overall energy use, both of which lowered overall GHG emissions, even
without emissions targets and the carbon market. 72
Although the financial crisis complicates the ETS's impact on
emissions, the relatively high price of allowances throughout most of
2008 suggests that the market was providing a significant incentive for
reducing emissions. Statistics for 2008 appear to support this conclusion.
According to the World Bank, "2008 verified emissions data (including
65 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, at Arts. 6, 12.
66 Id. at Art. 6.
67 ETS-Kyoto Linking Directive, supra note 64, at Art. 1 a.3(a).
61 See id. at Art. Ila.3(b).
69

See WORLD COMMISSION ON DAMS, DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR
DECISION-MAKING xxviii (2000).

70 ETS-Kyoto Linking Directive, supra note 64, at Art. I1b.6. Although not specified in the ETS
directive, these other "relevant international criteria" likely include the environmental and social
"safeguards policies of the World Bank and other multilateral development banks."
71 EC Communication on ETS Second Phase, supra note 54, at 10. See GREENPEACE, SEVEN
REASONS TO REJECT THE LINKING DIRECTIVE (2003), for a critique of the linking to global offset

markets.
72 KARAN CAPOOR & PHILIPPE AMBROSI, WORLD BANK, STATE AND TRENDS OF
THE CARBON

MARKET 2009, at 6 fig. 1 (2009) [hereinafter STATE OF THE CARBON MARKET 2009].
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Liechtenstein and Norway) amounted to 2031 MtCO 2 e for the 10,085
installations which reported. Comparing 2007 and 2008 emissions for
installations that reported for both years, it appears that year-on-year
emissions from these sources dropped on average by 4.6% in 2008.""
One analysis estimated that 40 percent of such emission cuts were
attributable to the price of carbon.74
3. THE THIRD PHASE (2013-2020)
In December 2008, the EU adopted the third phase of the ETS
for the post-Kyoto period from 2013-2020."5 The overall allocation for
the third phase is expected to decline 1.74% per year to a level of 1720
MtCOze annual emissions by 2020.76 By 2013, approximately 50 percent
of all emission allowances are to be auctioned, with nearly complete
auctioning of all allowances to electricity producers." The ETS will then
include almost the entire electricity sector and an increasing portion of
other industrial sectors. In addition, aviation emissions will also be added
to the ETS as of 2012.78 Overall, the new ETS is designed to reduce
emissions 21 percent from 2005 verified emissions.79 Perhaps the single
most important change to the revised ETS is the increased level of
harmonization and centralization. A single, EU-wide ETS target will
essentially replace the individual NAPs submitted by each Member State.
The carbon market will thus be fully integrated at the EU level, with the
regulatory authority to manage the market decisively residing in Brussels
and the European Commission.
The third phase of the ETS is simply one part of a significant
overhaul of European climate policy embodied in an ambitious "Climate
and Energy Package." In addition to changes to the ETS, the European
" See id. at 7.
74 Press Release, New Carbon Finance, Emissions from the EU ETS Down 3% in 2008 (Feb. 16,
2009).
75 See ETS Phase Ill Directive, supra note 42, at 63; see generally STATE OF THE CARBON MARKET
2009, supra note 72, at 8-14 (describing Phase Ill of the ETS).
76 ETS Phase Ill Directive, supra note 42, at 64.
77 Id. at 65; see also STATE OF THE CARBON MARKET 2009, supra note 72, at 10-11 (describing
plans for auctioning in Phase Ill).
78 Council Directive 2008/101/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 008) 3, 3, 8 (EC) (amending Directive 2003/87/EC
so as to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading
within the Community); see also STATE OF THE CARBON MARKET 2009, supra note 72, at 12.
79 ETS Phase III Directive, supra note 42, at 63-64; STATE OF THE CARBON MARKET 2009, supra
note 72, at 10.
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Union agreed in 2009 to: (i) an overall target to reduce GHG emissions
20 percent from 1990 levels,80 (ii) a higher target (potentially up to 30
percent reductions) if a satisfactory, global climate agreement can be
reached for the post-2012 period, 8 (iii) a target of 20 percent renewables
for final energy consumption,8 2 (iv) a 10 percent target for biofuels in all
gasoline and diesel fuels used for transport, 3 (v) a 20 percent
improvement in energy efficiency,84 and (vi) stricter fleet emissions
standards for new cars. 85
III. LESSONS LEARNED
Although still a work in progress, the ETS provides the best
basis for lessons to aid the development of a U.S. carbon market. Despite
unpredictable and irregular price fluctuations, the ETS successfully
created a market that functioned to set a single unified price for carbon.86
The trial phase, reinforced by the second phase, has signaled to each
Member State as well as the private sector in Europe, that GHG
emissions would no longer be free and that emissions trajectories would
need to come down over time. This signal resulted in a fundamental shift
in the energy culture of Europe. As compared to the United States, both
government officials and corporate leaders in Europe now accept the
need to curb long-term emissions trajectories, and Europe is now
significantly better positioned to be a technological and economic leader
in a carbon-constrained future. The following section discusses several
specific lessons that can be drawn from the EU experience, as well as

8o See ETS Phase Ill Directive, supra note 42, at 63.
8 Negotiations for a global climate regime to cover the period after the Kyoto Protocol are ongoing
and scheduled to be finalized in Copenhagen in December, 2010.
12 Council Directive 2009/28/EC (on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources
and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC). Whereas the
previous 2010 renewables target related to primary energy production, the 2020 target relates to
final energy consumption, including all imports. This is a significantly more ambitious target and
one which portends a sustained investment in renewable energy across Europe.
83

id.

84 The package, which was passed in December 2008, is comprised of several legislative
instruments, including: (i) a reviewed emissions trading directive; (ii) a so-called "effort sharing"
decision for those emissions outside the ETS; (iii) renewables and fuel quality directives: and
(iv) a new life cycle standard for CO 2 in vehicles. See Texts Adopted, EUR. PARL. DOC. P6_TAPROV (2008) 12-17, http://sunflower-sit.com/pdf/EU-regulationsEnviormentalissues.pdf.
8' ETS Phase II Directive, supra note 42.
16 See ELLERMAN & JOSKOW, supra note 56, at 12-15.
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how those lessons are reflected in the current leading proposal for a capand-trade system in the United States.
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF GOOD DATA
Experience with the trial period demonstrated the critical
importance of having sound information in establishing a market for
GHG emissions.87 The lack of certified historical data at the facility level
undermined preparation of the trial period's NAPs. This hindered the
regulators' ability to set emission caps that reflected on-the-ground
reality and credible, harmonized projections.8" This contributed to the
over-allocation of emissions allowances and the distortion of the market
price signal. The gaps in baseline data also prevented meaningful
evaluation of the ultimate effectiveness of the trial phase in reducing
emissions. 9 Changes for the third period attempt to fix the data flaws.
Most importantly, the Commission's actions will now rest on verified
emissions from 2005. In other words, most of the allocations will now be
based on actual, rather than presumed, data.
The United States has recognized the need to gather verified
emissions data. Beginning in 2007, a collection of forty states and Native
American tribes created a "Climate Registry" to collect verified
emissions data at the facility level.9" The Waxman-Markey bill that
passed the U.S. House of Representatives would essentially replace the
Climate Registry with a Federal GHG registry that would track, inter
alia: GHG emissions; production, import, and export of fuels that lead to
GHGs; and any capture and sequestration of GHGs.91 Recognizing
further that the caps in the Waxman-Markey bill are being set without the
benefit of the data to be collected through the registry, the WaxmanMarkey bill allows for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
to adjust the total amount of emissions allowances if current assumptions
about baseline emissions (i.e., emissions in 2005) prove not to be
87

See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 4, at 17-19 (discussing the difficulties

presented by data limitations in the Trial Phase).
88 See CONVERY, ELLERMAN & DE PERTHUIS, supra note 29, at 10 ("[L]ack of installation-specific

emissions data was perhaps the biggest problem.., in the allocation process.").
89 See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 4 at 17-19 (discussing the difficulties
presented by data limitations in the Trial Phase).
'0 See The Climate Registry: North America's Leaders Solving Climate Change Together,
www.theclimateregistry.org (last visited Dec. 20, 2009).
91 See American Clean Energy and Security Act, supra note 5, § 713(b).
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accurate. In this way, U.S. legislation clearly reflects concerns that there
be some ability to manage the carbon market in light of better data
becoming available.
B. TRANSPARENT, HARMONIZED ALLOCATIONS

Clear, transparent, and comparable allocation rules are essential
to a well functioning carbon market. The original ETS directive and the
European Commission's non-binding guidelines tried to set basic ground
rules for ensuring consistency in the development of the NAPs. But
because the ETS and the ensuing twenty-seven NAPs were established so
quickly, considerable allocation disparities existed between the Member
States in both the first and second ETS periods.92 The allocation process
lacked transparency at the national level and ultimately reflected
business-as-usual projections made by the regulated entities
themselves.93
Further, the European Commission's analysis of the NAPs
focused primarily on: the allocation method proposed by each Member
State; avoiding ex-post allocation adjustments; and assessing the
proposed allocation relative to the country's Kyoto target and
trajectory.94 Analysis of the competitive impacts within the European
Union or on the role of state aid in assisting private enterprises was
generally rather superficial. Thus, for example, a pulp mill in Italy might
be given significantly more pollution allowances than an identical mill in
Germany, or the Italian plant might be given greater state assistance in
curbing emissions.95 The obvious competitive implications of this policy
were ignored because of the desire to launch the ETS well before the
Kyoto Protocol's reporting period. The relatively hands-off approach by
the Commission in evaluating the NAPs may have paved the way for the
launch of the ETS,96 but it also contributed to the over-allocation of
emission allowances in the trial period.
See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 4 at 17-18.
93 See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 4, at 18-19.'
94 EC Communication on ETS Second Phase,supra note 54, at 10.
92

95 See Mufson, supranote 4 (quoting a European paper industry executive).
96 Poor data and unharmonized allocation
rules might have been a relatively acceptable
consequence for expediting the launch of the ETS and for gaining political support across a wide
range of interests in Europe, especially given that Europe's main economic competitor, the
United States, had pulled out of the Kyoto regulatory framework.
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The allocation rules for the ETS's third phase have changed in
two significant ways. First, Member States rightfully realized that the
benefits, if any, of developing twenty-seven distinct NAPs were clearly
outweighed by the drawbacks of competition distortion and market
inefficiency. Allocations across Member States will now be centralized
and rules will be harmonized. In the future there will only be one EUwide cap on emissions. Second, the principal allocation method in the
future will be auctioning off the emission allowances. Nearly 100 percent
of allowances for the power sector will be auctioned by 2013. Other
sectors will face an increasing percentage of auctioning over time.
Overall, the changes in how allocations are made will shift regulatory
responsibility almost completely to the European Commission.
To some extent, the EU's experience with national allocations is
reflective of the unique political status of the European Union and is not
directly applicable to the situation in the United States. EU Member
States are sovereign countries with, among other things, their own
continued commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. Their autonomy is far
greater than that of the fifty states of the United States. A national
emissions cap in the United States is not likely to be distributed along
state political boundaries, but will likely be distributed directly to the
individual private entities. Slightly less clear in the United States,
however, is how a federal cap-and-trade system will relate to the
emerging state and regional cap-and-trade systems within the United
States. The Waxman-Markey bill proposes to preempt all sub-national
cap-and-trade systems and replace them with one national system (and
thus one national carbon market), but that approach is receiving some
opposition from states.97 In the end, the U.S. system and the European
system as planned in the third phase will both be unified 'federal'
systems, but Europe's path to that outcome has necessarily been more
circuitous than that of the United States.
C. BANKING CREDITS

The ETS also provides important lessons about the banking of
credits. During the ETS trial period, it was not fully clear if there would
be a second or third period. Thus, banking of credits from one period to
the next was not allowed. Without carry-over credits, once the trial
97 See American Clean Energy and Security Act, supra note 5, § 861.
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period was over, all excess credits were useless. As a result, this put
further downward pressure on the carbon price, when it became clear that
too many allowances had been issued. When the price of allowances
dated for 2007 began to drop, the price could not be stabilized because
carbon emission credits held no long-term value. In response to this
experience, the European Union allowed banking from the second to the
third period, which has had a stabilizing effect on the price of carbon
credits for much of the second period (although the international
financial crisis has contributed to some price volatility between the
fourth quarter of 2008 and the middle of 2009). Nonetheless, prices are
significantly above their 2006-2007 historic lows and are estimated to
maintain a price of up to € 20 ($28) over the remainder of Phase II
(2008-2012) and up to E 40 ($57) for Phase III (2013-2020)." 8 Possibly
because of the EU experience, the United States proposed legislation
would allow unlimited banking of emissions from one year to any
subsequent year.99
D. LINKING

TO OTHER CARBON MARKETS

The European Union also demonstrated the challenges and
opportunities posed by linking with other markets for GHG emissions.
Under the EU's "linking directive," the European Union allowed trading
of a portion of offsets generated through the Kyoto Protocol's clean
development mechanism and joint implementation.' ° Effective as of
January 1, 2008, the European Union and Norway also agreed to
integrate Norway's national cap-and-trade system into the larger EU
ETS. 10 1

98

See STATE OF

THE CARBON MARKET

2009, supra note 72, at 8 tbl. 3.

9 See American Clean Energy and Security Act, supra note 5, § 725(a). The Waxman-Markey Bill
provides for even more fluidity in the market by allowing limited borrowing of emission credits
from future periods (with certain limitations and penalties). Such borrowing allows some
flexibility for the regulated enterprises because the proposed US cap-and-trade system will be
based on one-year emissions reporting periods, not the multi-year 'phases' found in the EU ETS
or the Kyoto Protocol. A company that expects further reductions in the future (because, for
example, they are making long-term capital investments in the operational efficiency or in
pollution control technology) may wish to borrow emissions allowances from future years to
cover the short term higher emissions.
'o See ETS-Kyoto Linking Directive, supra note 64, at 18.
'01 Press Release, European Commission, Emissions Trading: Commission Announces Linkage EU
ETS with Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein (Oct. 26, 2007).
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In this way, the European Union has demonstrated the feasibility
and practicality of integrating several GHG reduction markets through
project-based, bilateral, or regional agreements. Enlarging the number of
both buyers and sellers in the market presumably allows for a more
efficient market overall, much like the liberalization of trade in any good
or service. As demonstrated by the EU system, some technical issues
exist to ensure compatibility between the systems so that emissions
reductions traded between markets are roughly equivalent. In particular,
various systems may have different cost containment provisions to
safeguard against the overall compliance costs going too high. These
safety valve measures allow for the government to release more
allowances or take other steps to lower compliance costs, if the price of a
reduction allowance exceeds a certain threshold. Linking one market
with a cost-containment mechanism to markets without such a
mechanism could transfer the safety valve to the linked-in market. This
means that if one government is determined to maintain a safety valve
price of, say, $20 per ton of emissions, then that price would necessarily
02
have to be maintained for the entire, combined markets.'1
The Waxman-Markey bill clearly contemplates fully integrating
with the EU ETS and similar emissions trading systems. Although it does
not refer explicitly to the ETS, it allows U.S. entities to use credits issued
from other "qualifying" emissions trading systems. A qualifying system
must be run by a national or supranational foreign government, must
impose a mandatory absolute tonnage limit on GHG emissions, and must
be at least as "stringent" as the program created in the United States."°3
The EU ETS would appear to qualify.
As compared to linking with another cap-and-trade system,
linking to outside offset markets (most notably offsets from the CDM) is
more problematic. Offset markets only expand the supply of GHG
credits that are available to the regulated community, without any
increase in the number of buyers. This reduces the cost of compliance,
but it also suppresses the price signal that the market sends to incentivize
domestic emissions reductions. This can exacerbate the impact of any
over-allocation of emission allowances as occurred in the ETS trial
phase.

102 See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,

supra note 4, at 29-30 (discussing experience with

linking in the ETS).
103 See American Clean Energy and Security Act, supra note 5, § 728(a).
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Any U.S. cap-and-trade system will likely be linked to the CDM
or similar international offset markets. Indeed, the Waxman-Markey bill,
recently passed by the House of Representatives, allows for the use of
offsets (from both domestic and international sources) to replace up to
two billion tons of GHG emissions annually."4 Such liberal use of offsets
may be politically necessary for final passage of any U.S. climate
legislation (because it helps to keep the price of reducing emissions low),
but this may tend to delay investments necessary for long-term emission
reductions domestically.
A related issue is the need to ensure that any offsets allowed into
one market from another country or carbon market represent long-term,
additional emissions reductions.' 5 This challenge of ensuring that offsets
provide additional climate benefits is particularly relevant to offsets from
the CDM. Through the CDM, parties to the Kyoto Protocol are able to
purchase certified emission reductions (CERs) generated in developing
countries that operate without an overall emissions cap. Even though
more than $13 billion worth of CERs were transferred in 2007, the U.S.
General Accounting Office concluded that "[t]he overall effect of the
CDM on international emissions is uncertain, largely because it is nearly
impossible to determine the level of emissions that would have occurred
in the absence of each project" [also known as "additionality"].° 6 The
challenge of ensuring additionality from CDM and similar projects is
only likely to grow in the future. This is particularly true if the current
international negotiations are successful in bringing credits from avoided
deforestation into the offset market. Indeed, the European Union
currently excludes the use of CERs from land-use and forestry projects,
presumably because of concerns over how to ensure additionality. 07
'
'04 See id. §§ 721(d)(l)(A), 731-741. Linkage with the EU system is a central point of discussion for

any federal US cap-and-trade system. The European Union has already considered linking with
the subnational carbon markets in the United States, but such linkage may be impeded by issues
of the constitutionality of states or subnational regions making treaties with foreign governments.
See RALF SCHULE & WOLFGANG STERK, WUPPERTAL INSTITUT, OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF
LINKING THE EU ETS WITH OTHER EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEMES (Mar. 2008) (prepared for the

European
Parliament),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies/download.do?file= 19802.
'05 See David A. Farhrenthold & Steven Mufson, Deconstructing the Climate Bill: Q&A on the
Mammoth House Measure, WASH. POST, July 6, 2009, at A6 (highlighting some of the concerns
with the reliance on offsets in the proposed American Clean Energy and Security Act); see also
American Clean Energy and Security Act, supra note 5, § 861.
106 U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 4, at 39.
07o See ETS-Kyoto Linking Directive, supra note 64, at Art. II a.3(b).
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The EU experience thus suggests that the incorporation of offsets
can lower the overall costs of facing the regulated community. Some
limitations on the use of offsets are desirable, however, both to maintain
some control over the supply (and thus the price) of emission allowances
available in the market, and to enhance the environmental impact of the
market system. The European Union has imposed conditions both to
ensure additionality of any offsets purchased as well as to promote other
sustainable development goals."0 8
The same caution is being reflected to some extent in the likely
U.S. approach to offsets. The Waxman-Markey bill, for example, does
embrace the use of international offsets, but their uses are conditioned in
a variety of ways. To reflect general concerns of additionality,
international offsets are not treated the same as domestic offsets." 9 In
addition, the bill requires that the Secretary of State pre-approve
particular sectors in developing countries before any offsets can be used
in the U.S. market." 0 The United States is also poised to accept offsets
from international efforts to reduce deforestation, but only if adequate
safeguards are in place to ensure climate benefits and minimize collateral
damage to the environmental and social values of the forests."'
E. SAFEGUARDING INDUSTRY COMPETITIVENESS AND LEAKAGE
The European Union has also struggled with issues of
competitiveness, namely the concern that their industries would become
noncompetitive with similar industries in countries facing no carbon cap.
The potential shift of carbon-intensive industries towards countries
without carbon caps not only presents possible job losses and other
economic impacts that could undermine political support for the ETS,
but also raises concerns of "leakage." Leakage occurs when carbonintensive industries simply move their operations (and their emissions)
offshore to countries facing no carbon cap; in this way, the ETS might

108 See

supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.

109See American Clean Energy and Security Act, supra note 5, § 722(d)(1)(A) (1.25 international
offset credits are required to equal 1.0 domestic offset credit).
"0 See id. § 743.
Id. § 741; See generally David Hunter, International Climate Negotiations: Opportunities and
Challenges for the Obama Administration, 19 DUKE ENVTL L. & POL'Y FORUM 247, 265-71
(2009) (arguing that avoided deforestation should not be included in the CDM's offset market).
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reduce European emissions, but not reduce net global emissions and not
provide any net climate benefit.
There has been no evidence of significant leakage or
competitiveness impacts in the first and second phases of the ETS."I2
Most observers believe that the relative abundance of allowances
available in both the first and second phases, and the fact that the
allowances were given away freely, probably means that relatively little
incentive existed to shift industrial activity offshore during these
phases." 3 Factors other than the price of carbon, for example, production
capacity or the independent fluctuation in prices of end products or key
inputs, appear to dominate the rise and fall of trade in the economic
sectors covered by the ETS. 4
Leakage and competitiveness remain concerns for the stricter
third phase, where presumably the price of carbon will be higher. The
European Union has considered several measures in response to the
concerns over shifting jobs and potential leakage including proposals to
enact a border adjustment that would require importers of products
manufactured with relatively high GHG emissions to purchase credits to
reflect their relatively inefficient production processes. Ultimately, the
European Union rejected the border adjustments and explored ways to
lower the effective price of climate regulation on those industries
believed to be most susceptible to foreign competition, by, for example,
making susceptible industries eligible to receive their initial allowances
for free." 5
The United States has similarly struggled with ways to protect
domestic industry from international competition in a world with
asymmetric GHG policies. Draft legislation in the United States has
proposed both a border tax adjustment effective in 2020 and the free
auctioning of additional permits to particularly trade-vulnerable

112 See generally CONVERY, ELLERMAN & DE PERTHUIS, supra note 29, at 19-22 (concluding that

there is no evidence in the first phase that leakage had occurred); U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF., supra note 4, at 20-22 (discussing the potential for leakage from the first phase).
113See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 4, at 20-21 (discussing the potential for
leakage from the first phase).'
114 CONVERY, ELLERMAN & DE PERTHUIS, supra note 29, at 20.

"5 For a concise history of the evolution of European energy policy, see Jorge Vasconcelos,
Towards a European Energy Policy, in SETTING EU PRIORITIES 32 (Peter Ludlow ed., 2007) (on
file with the author).
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industries." 6 These provisions are controversial because they are viewed
as unnecessary protectionism and counter to the separate goal of global
trade liberalization." 7 Moreover, the EU experience suggests that
concerns over leakage may be over-stated at least at the price levels for
emission reductions seen thus far in the ETS and expected through the
first few decades of the U.S. carbon market. By providing a break to
particularly carbon intensive industries on the grounds of
competitiveness concerns, the effectiveness of both the EU and U.S.
carbon markets is reduced.
If the United States enacts significant GHG caps, the
competitiveness issue will alter the dynamic of future climate
negotiations with significant implications for international trade and
other international policy areas. In the future, the primary
competitiveness and leakage concerns for both Europe and the United
States will be with the large middle-income countries, particularly China,
India, and Brazil. This will add to the political pressure on these
countries to accept some emissions caps, but it may also spill over into
global trade talks. These large and increasingly powerful countries could
walk away from the climate negotiations in retaliation of what may be
seen as coercive trade-related tactics by the United States and European
Union. In any event, the issue of how to address potential
competitiveness issues is critical for the post-Kyoto climate negotiations,
and ultimately must be resolved as part of the global response to climate
change.
F. EQUITY, FAIRNESS AND COST DISTRIBUTION
The European Union also provides some significant lessons with
respect to distribution, opportunity costs, and windfall profits." This
remains a major point of discussion for the proposed U.S. cap-and-trade
system. It relates directly to whether permits should be initially auctioned
off or given for free to industries. Emission allowances can be allocated
116

"7

See American Clean Energy and Security Act, supra note 5, §§ 761-67, 781-94 (addressing
carbon leakage and the disposition of allowances); see also Farhrenthold & Mufson, supra note
105.
See Editorial, Cap-and-Pay-Off.No Time to Ignite a Trade War, WASH. POST, July 5, 2009, at
A18 (arguing that the Senate should oppose these trade-related provisions of the House-passed

American Clean Energy Security Act).

1s See generally ELLERMAN & JOSKOW, supra note 56, at 24-31 (discussing opportunity costs and
windfall profits in the first trial phase).
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in a variety of ways: existing plants can be grandfathered in and given all
of their allowances; allowances could be allocated according to some
technology-based benchmarks that equate to a particularly efficient
technology for that industrial sector; or all allowances could be auctioned
off.
Giving all of the allowances for free to existing polluters is
always politically easier because it reduces the lobbying pressure from
electric utilities and other powerful regulated interests. Benchmarking is
technically, administratively, and politically more difficult, but it can
lead existing industries to adopt more efficient technologies over time. If
properly designed, auctioning provides for more transparent and
equitable distribution of the credits in the system and gives the
government the greatest source of revenue. Revenue raised from the
auctions can be returned to the consumers or invested in other climate
friendly, energy efficiency technology.
Subject only to very broad conditions, EU Member States were
allowed in the first and second phases to determine how they would
allocate the allowances. The Commission required that at least 5 percent
of the allowances could be auctioned during the first phase and 10
percent during the second phase." 9 Member States almost uniformly
auctioned even less than the allowed amount giving virtually all of the
allowances away to the regulated industries. In some ways, this was the
price the European Union had to pay to be able to implement the ETS
quickly. 2 ' But the industries' arguments that receiving free permits
would lower the regulatory costs borne by consumers are not necessarily
supported by the EU experience. Although industry did not incur out-ofpocket costs to purchase the permits, it nonetheless faced the same
opportunity costs in determining whether to sell or hold their permits as
it would have faced if forced to pay for the permits in the first place.' 2 '
Thus, the opportunity costs of polluting and holding a permit would, if
the market works efficiently, be roughly equivalent to what they would
have paid in an auction. Indeed, consumer costs in Europe did not appear
to depend on whether permits were auctioned, but rather on the extent to
which the opportunity costs could be passed through by the regulated

...BAUSCH & MEHLING, supra note 3, at 55.
120 CONVERY, ELLERMAN & DE PERTHUIS, supra note 29, at 8-9.
121 See ELLERMAN & JOSKOW, supra note 56, at 27.
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industry to the end consumers.22 This, in turn, appears to have been
dictated by the structure of the electricity sector, and other regulated
industries, not by the decision to distribute the permits for free.' 23
To the extent that energy prices rose to reflect the price of
emissions allowances without any additional rise in production costs,
utilities and other recipients of free allowances presumably received
substantial windfall profits.' 24 They had been given permits for free that
immediately had a market value.' 25 To be sure, this at least improved
industries' balance sheets even if they used every allowance.
For the third period, Europe has decided to auction almost all of
the emission allowances for the electricity generation sector. For other
sectors, auctioning will be phased in over time. The primary exception to
auctioning will be for sectors deemed vulnerable to competitive trade
pressures, where a proportion of allowances will be given for free based
on a technological benchmark set for each sector. By increasing the
percentage of permits that will be auctioned, the European Union hopes
to capture some of the costs of allowances as public revenues.
Despite the clear advantages evidenced by the experience in
Europe for significant auctioning of emission allowances, the United
States appears poised to follow much the same path as Europe. The
Waxman-Markey bill initially allocates 85 percent of all permits for free,
phasing out the free allocation by 2030.126 By one estimate,
The current House draft earmarks $254 billion in allowances-one
sixth of the estimated total value of allowances from 2012 through
2030-and gives them to industries most sensitive to carbon pricing,
including coal-based electric power generators, energy-intensive

& DE PERTHUIS, supra note 29; BAUSCH & MEHLING, supra
note 3, at 55.
23 BAUSCH & MEHLING, supra note 3, at 55; ELLERMAN & JOSKOW, supra note 56, at 25-26.
124 See, e.g., Mufson, supra note 4; CONVERY, ELLERMAN & DE PERTHUIS, supra note 29, at 19.
122See, e.g., CONVERY, ELLERMAN

But see ELLERMAN & JOSKOW, supra note 56, at 27 (noting the conceptual difficulty in defining
and measuring windfall profits).
125See, e.g., ELLERMAN & JOSKOW, supra note 56, at 24-31 (discussing opportunity costs and
windfall profits in the first trial phase); BAUSCH & MEHLING, supra note 3, at 54-55; Mufson,
supra note 4 ("[I]nstead of charging customers for the cost of buying allowances to cover the
shortfall, utilities in much of Europe charged customers for 100 percent of the tradable
allowances they were given-even though the government handed them out free. Electricity
rates soared.").
126American Clean Energy and Security Act, supra note 5, §§ 781-794; see also Farhrenthold &
Mufson, supranote 105.
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manufacturers vulnerable27 to foreign competition, oil refineries and
the automobile industry.'

The EU experience suggests that although such a give-away may
be politically necessary it will have little impact on lowering costs to
consumers and may result simply in distributing a new class of assets to
the most polluting industries.
IV. CONCLUSION
The experience of the EU ETS helps to understand current policy
discussions in the U.S. Congress over the development of a federal capand-trade system. Current U.S. efforts do reflect some clear lessons from
Europe. The EU's experience with a cap-and-trade system amply
demonstrated that a functioning carbon market can be createdsomething that was not a certainty even five years ago. Moreover, the
fact that the EU market functions as well as it does probably ensured that
alternatives to a cap-and-trade approach (for example, a carbon tax or
direct regulation of carbon) have not gained any political traction inside
the U.S. Congress.
The EU experience also demonstrated how a cap-and-trade
system should be nested with other policies in a more general, integrated
energy and climate policy. Given the restricted coverage of the ETS
(slightly less than half of the EU's emissions are covered by the ETS),
other polices and measures have been important in Europe's efforts to
tackle climate change.128 Although U.S. climate policy is likely to center
on a cap-and-trade system, a wide variety of policies are part of the
currently proposed regulatory mix, including efficiency and renewable
portfolio standards;'29 performance standards for new and existing coalfired power plants;13° energy efficiency standards for buildings, lighting,

127

Stephen Mufson, High-Stakes Quest for Permission to Pollute: Interest Groups Press Congress
for Cap-and-TradeAllowances in Climate-ChangeLegislation, WASH. POST, June 5, 2009, at
Al1,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/contentlarticle/2009/06/04/AR2009060404435.htm (citing a study by Point Carbon, a

market analysis firm).
128 See
129 See

130Id.

supratext accompanying notes 87-127.

American Clean Energy and Security Act, supra note 5, § 101.
§ 116 (adding a new § 812).
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and other appliances; 3' and significant research and development
efforts.' 32 The current U.S. legislation would, however, also eliminate
some regulatory options, greatly curtailing existing regulatory authority
to curb emissions of GHGs under the Clean Air Act.'33 This reduction in
existing policy tools is a major weakness in the current legislation.
The EU experience also demonstrates the importance of
international cooperation for providing long-term stability to the carbon
market. The Kyoto framework provided a long-term political signal
ensuring that the European Union would need to cut GHG emissions
beyond the trial phase, which helped maintain price stability in the
second period. Moreover, the ongoing negotiations of a post-Kyoto
framework help to maintain assurances that Europe will continue to
address emissions beyond 2012, the end of the first Kyoto reporting
period. In this respect, U.S. participation in a post-Kyoto regime will be
critical for sending a similar long-term political signal to U.S. industry
that the world is permanently entering a carbon-constrained era.
The United States may also be on the verge of repeating some of
the errors already exposed in the EU ETS. Many of the same mistakes,
resulting from the same types of political pressures, are evident in the
legislation that recently passed the U.S. House of Representatives. As
currently drafted, the Waxman-Markey bill will likely result in a carbon
market that over-allocates carbon allowances or allocates them in a way
that so lowers the price signal as to negate any incentive for reducing
GHGs. European regulators bowed to industry pressure in its trial phase,
and likely so will the United States. The whole point of an emissions
reduction market is to price GHG emissions sufficiently high so that it
incentivizes behavioral changes and leads to real emission reductions.
The market only works if costs increase on major emitters. The United
States is learning how difficult this is to accomplish politically.
The United States is learning what Europe learned a decade ago,
that political'forces shape the carbon market in ways that lower the costs
and thus its short-term effectiveness. Europe has shown the importance
of being flexible and leaving room for experimentation and adaptation.
An adaptive management approach to creating and regulating the climate
1'' Id. §§ 201 (buildings), 211 (lighting), 212 (other appliances).
132 See, e.g., id. §§ 114 (carbon capture and sequestration), 171 (energy innovation hubs).
I' §§ 831-835 (prohibiting any GHG from inter alia being listed as a criteria air pollutant or a
ld.
hazardous air pollutant or forming the basis for new source review or Title V permit
requirements under the Clean Air Act).
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markets allow mistakes to be made, feedback loops to inform regulators
of current challenges, and adjustments made to the market over time,
including increasing its ambition and stringency.
Provisions for reviewing and modifying the cap-and-trade
system, based on initial experience thus must be a vital component of
any U.S. cap-and-trade legislation. The Waxman-Markey Bill does
provide for periodic review and evaluation of US climate policy.' 34 The
EPA Administrator is required to report to Congress in 2013 and every
four years thereafter on a variety of issues relating to emerging climate
science, potential climate impacts, and the cost-effectiveness of U.S.
efforts in achieving adequate GHG reductions.135 In addition to
evaluating existing policy responses, the President is authorized to take
additional steps to ensure that GHG reductions are sufficient to meet the
legislation's goals (i.e., to ensure that temperatures do not increase more
than 2°C over pre-industrial goals).' 36 Unfortunately, the legislation
provides relatively little room for discretion through the executive
branch, at least with respect to the basic contours of the cap-and-trade
system. Thus, any significant changes in the future that are meant to
adapt to emerging science would have to be adopted through Congressa cumbersome and politicized process that limits the adaptive nature of
the proposed U.S. cap-and-trade system.' 37
The willingness and ability of the United States to adopt an
adaptive or learning-by-doing approach to its cap-and-trade system is
also hampered by the lost decade of U.S. climate policy during the Bush
Administration. In light of the relatively lax cap outlined in the WaxmanMarkey bill, the United States will likely see a carbon market that, like
the ETS trial phase, sends a relatively minor price signal to the market at
least until 2020. Even then, it is not certain that the United States will
have caught up to the experiential advantage Europe gained by its first
and second ETS phases. Europe is now nearly a full decade ahead in its
experimentation with, and adaptation to, a carbon market; European
political and corporate leaders have already had time to make their
psychological, economic, and technical adjustments to a carbonconstrained future. The ETS's third phase promises to be substantially
more effective between now and 2020 than is the effort outlined in
Id. §§ 705-07.
"' Id. § 705.
136 Id. § 707.
114

'3 Id. § 707(b) (noting that the President could submit recommendations for legislative action).
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proposed U.S. legislation. Positioning Europe in this way to be a leader
in emissions reductions may be the most important and long-lasting
achievement of the early phases of the ETS. As the United States enters
its 'learning-by-doing' stage, the question is whether its regulatory
structure will prove flexible enough to catch up to Europe over time.

